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The Middle Voice in Eckhart and Modern Continental Philosophy 
 
Abstract: 
The recurring narrative of the relinquishment of human will animates the spiritual 
discourses of almost every mystical tradition. But contemporary discussions of 
spirituality gravitate towards exasperation when acknowledging the radical impotence 
of human agents, while much modern philosophy has found itself unable to think 
beyond the aporia of freedom and determinism. 
The ability to mediate between total subjective autonomy and radical dissolution 
in God is vital if we are to avoid the dualism that Meister Eckhart subverts with his 
conception of detachment (gelassenheit). Heidegger takes up the terminology of Eckhart 
here, but provides a more philosophically astute sense of releasement. This article 
argues that both Heidegger and Eckhart draw upon the middle voice, an ancient 
linguistic mode that places agency between activity and passivity. By uncovering traces 
of the middle voice, I propose that philosophy and theology bear with a grammatical 
cleavage that constitutes our experience of the world. 
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In an early work, the Talks of Instruction, Meister Eckhart has this to say: ³The most 
powerful prayer, one well-nigh omnipotent to gain all things, and the noblest work of all 
is that which proceeds from a bare mind´ (Eckhart, 1987, p. 12). For some people 
(FNKDUW¶V FRQFHSWLRQ RI SUD\HU FDQ VHHP remote, barren, or elitist with its call to 
abandon intercession and petition (Mills, 1996). It seems that only negation can 
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constitute the appropriate attitude towards God, which is almost to say that the adoption 
of any attitude or orientation is a failure in relation to that to which there can be no 
relation. We might be left wondering what approach we are to take. Later, in the poem 
µ*UDQXPVLQDSLV¶(FNKDUWKDVWKHIROORZLQJDGYLFHIRUWKRVHH[SORULQJWKHSDWKWR*RG 
Leave place, leave time 
Avoid even image! 
Go forth without a way 
On the narrow path, 
Then you will find the desert track (Quoted in McGinn, 2001, p. 114). 
Modern interpreters have often taken Eckhart to mean that we abandon paths, images 
and our own individual will by aligning ourselves with the greater will of God, and that 
this must be what Eckhart is getting at with his ideas of detachment and becoming 
nothing (Eckhart, 1981, p. xiv). This conventional interpretation is rejected by Denys 
Turner, and, less directly, by Eckhart himself (Turner, 1998, chapters 6 and 7). One key 
concern of this essay will be to develop a new context in which to consider the more 
radical conception of detachment that Eckhart has in mind, namely the linguistic middle 
voice. 
In this essay I will argue that the recurring narrative of the relinquishment of 
individual will is too often interpreted within the horizon of a polarised conception of 
agency. This polarisation emerges as the opposition between an individual human will, 
DQG*RG¶VGLYLQHZLOOand from the perspective of this general structure, one pole will 
tend to dominate. We might imagine ourselves to be at varying degrees along this axis 
as we move closer or further from the ground of our being. We may even regard an 
identification of ourselves with the divine element within as the supreme goal of the 
religious life. This narrative of spiritual development is common these days within the 
 3 
context of spirituality, broadly conceived. But I want to suggest that the tension implicit 
within this narrative expresses a metaphysical commitment that is constituted in the 
linguistic structures of many modern languages, a structure that encourages a 
misreading of Eckhart, as well as the Christian mystical tradition in general (to say 
nothing of a similar misinterpretation of central insights within a number of other world 
religions). 
So this essay contemplates the force of logic within the structure of prevailing 
discourse and language. The force of that logic is derived from an assumption of binary 
opposition, an opposition fundamental to the structures of theological understanding. In 
Biblical hermeneutics we see this structure represented in the idea that what is not 
exegesis, reading out, must fall within the category of eisegesis, reading in. In the 
hermeneutics of divination, for example in astrology, the process of speculative reading 
through the casting of horoscopes, crosses over into a symbolism which allows for the 
given realisations that constitute the work of divination (Cornelius, 2003, chapter 15). A 
further example can be found in the three stages of orison, of medieval prayer, which 
describes a path from recollection, through quiet, and into contemplation likewise 
charting the transition between the active and the passive (Underhill, 2002, p. 306). 
Despite these and other examples, religious insight is often regarded in terms of either 
something realised or revealed, as something speculative or projected. The force of 
logic within this duality expresses an anthropology in which human agency is called to 
submit to divine will, by a path of self-abnegation, an apophatic anthropology. 
I will argue that the philosophy of Martin Heidegger offers an opportunity to 
think outside the polarisation of agency just described. +HLGHJJHU¶V SKLORVRSK\ RI
language is central to his later ontology, and his use of poetic discourse synthesises the 
central significance of linguistic forms within philosophy, with the collapse of the kind 
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of Kantian subjectivity that seems to preclude the nuanced agency that I wish to 
consider. This conception of nuanced agency, that is neither an autonomous Kantian 
subjectivity nor a resigned passivity, expresses a µstructured capability,¶1 DµFRQGLWLRQHG
IUHHGRP¶ , UHJDUG WKH PLGGOHYRLFH DV DQ LPSRUWDQW OLQJXLVWLF ILJXUH WKDW UHIOHFWV WKLV
stage between activity and passivity. As postmodern theory has contended, theoretical 
constructions of identity are by no means committed to a clear post-Kantian autonomy, 
yet it has been convincingly argued that the pragmatic assumptions of moral attitudes 
and approaches take human agency to be a prerequisite, an idea famously developed by 
Peter Strawson (Strawson, 2008), and, in somewhat different terms, by Paul Ricoeur. 
Some conception of autonomy is part of our cultural DNA, and falls below the radar of 
postmodern thought. Yet there remains a general incapacity to account for that 
autonomy given the ascendency of ever more elaborate forms of determinism. Our 
inability to conceive of a nuanced, structured or distributed agency might be a reflection 
of our inability to announce the linguistic middle voice in most modern languages in 
anything other than simple reflexive forms (e.g. the boy washes himself). In order to 
elaborate this thesis, I will outline a basic understanding of the middle voice and show 
how its employment would more faithfully reflect our actual being in the world. I will 
go on to consider to what extent Ricoeur, Derrida and finally Heidegger have employed 
this form in their attempts to articulate human agency and identity. 
 
The Middle Voice 
 
While ready definitions of the middle voice remain elusive (Andersen, 1994, p. 10; 
Eberhard, 2004, p. 9), speaking generally we can say that modern languages tend to rely 
RQO\RQWKHDFWLYHDQGSDVVLYHYRLFH7KHVHQWHQFHµWKHVWXGHQWZULWHVWKHHVVD\¶FOHDUO\
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indicates the active agency of the student. Alternatively, we might have said that µWKH
HVVD\ LV ZULWWHQ E\ WKH VWXGHQW¶ +HUH WKH SDVVLYH YRLFH LV HQJDJHG DQG WKH HVVD\ LV
promoted to the subject being written, and it is this basic grammatical structure that 
designates the relation between subject and action, known as the voice or diathesis. But 
what about those precious times when we might say that essays write themselves? Many 
of us will have experience of creative moments where our activities require attention 
and engagement, but which somehow seem, at least on some level, to do themselves. In 
these moments we are in some sense both active and passive.  We are taken up into the 
creative act. Poets and artists commonly describe their relation to the work of art in 
terms of a form of passive activity, or less commonly, active passivity. Michelangelo 
offers us a clear example where he suggests that the statue emerges from the marble. 
His role as the artist is as midwife to the sculpture which is born, or released, from the 
material. And so it is this domain of attentive responsivity, epitomised by certain 
Renaissance figures, which calls for the expression of the middle voice. Or perhaps we 
should better say that the withdrawal of the middle voice in modern languages reflects 
the sedimentation of the Cartesian and Kantian subjectivity that constitutes the 
autonomous agent of modern metaphysics. 
 Consequently we might not be surprised to discover that some ancient languages 
(Sanskrit, Ancient Greek and Indo-Persian) employ the middle voice to express an event 
that we could say engulfs subjecWDQGREMHFW+RZHYHU5RODQG%DUWKHV¶VXJJHVWLRQWKDW
the application of the middle voice is anterior to the emergence of the subject/object 
polarity seems more plausible (Barthes, 1989, pp. 17-21). The structure of ancient 
Greek - particularly Aristotelian - thinking, presents human making as a fostering of 
what nature grants, a bringing-IRUWKRIWKLQJVLQWRWKHLURZQQDWXUH7KXVQDWXUH¶VRZQ
intentionality is creatively borne in the event of poiesis ± or bringing forth (Dupré, 
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1993, pp. 22-29). The teleological structure of Greek ontology is entirely consistent 
with its linguistic adherence to the middle voice, since intentionality resides not only 
within the interested subject, but the cosmos itself is replete with an order akin to 
intentionality.  
Reflecting this cosmology, ancient Greek employs a number of forms of the 
PLGGOH YRLFH IURP UHODWLYHO\ FOHDU UHIOH[LYH XVDJH VXFK DV ³WKH FDW FOHDQV LWVHOI´ WR
more complex constructions such as causative, permissive and deponent middle voices, 
the details of which need not detain us here. For a long time these forms have exercised 
New Testament interpretation, from which many examples could be cited.2 Acts 22:16 
VD\V IRU H[DPSOH ³5LVH have yourself baptized and allow your sins to be washed 
DZD\´ :DOODFH 1996, pp. 426-427). Religious rituals provide probably the best 
examples of the intermingling of activity and passivity that characterizes the middle 
voice. Clearly the religious act cannot be complete if it simply expresses the 
determinate agency and will of the autonomous subject ± we cannot simply cleanse 
ourselves. Yet, as beings endowed with free will, we do not entirely forego human 
agency even (or especially) where that agency is called into submission. For better and 
for worse, every truly theological endeavor is a combination of divine revelation as well 
as human figuration, or as Paul Ricoeur says, of manifestation and proclamation 
(Ricoeur, 1995). 3  And the crisis of modernity arises in no small part due to our 
incapacity to distinguish between the two. But this incapacity turns out to be a saving 
power also, for it is this space between seeking and finding that seems faithful to the 
most profound experiences of human existence. 
In contrast to the understanding within ancient Greek, the middle voice is not 
easily heard in modern English, though traces are to be found on bumper stickers which 
GHFODUH WKDW µ6WXII +DSSHQV¶ RU SKUDVHV VXFK DV µ, ILQG P\VHOI LQ DJUHHPHQW¶ DQG µLW
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RFFXUVWRPH¶:HQRUPDOO\VSHDNRIVRPHWKLQJRFFXUULQJWRXVZKHQZHDUHengaged 
in some kind of active thinking process. While we know ourselves to be actively doing 
something, we also appreciate that when something occurs to us, it presents itself as a 
gift. It is this gift character, and our capacity to properly receive what is given in it, that 
we know immediately to be neither simply active nor passive. The ambiguity of this gift 
FKDUDFWHUDOVRUHVRQDWHVLQWKHUDWKHUFXULRXV(QJOLVKSKUDVH³WKHJLUOIHOOSUHJQDQW´RU
³,¶YH IDOOHQ SUHJQDQW´ ZKLFK GRHV QRW GHQRWH RQO\ XQSlanned pregnancy, but rather 
seems to indicate that we are given to a process in which we are clearly both active and 
passive. These moments of grace, as we might call them, raise again the theological 
ground in which, I want to suggest, our freedom can be properly expressed. In the terms 
of Eckhart, it is only through a gift of grace that the soul can find its way towards the 
divine light, yet only within that movement towards God is the soul free of the bonds of 
exterior life:  
As God is the Prime Mover of nature, so also He creates free impulses towards 
Himself and to all good things. Grace renders the will free that it may do 
HYHU\WKLQJZLWK*RG¶VKHOSZRUNLQJZLWKJUDFHDVZLWKDQ LQVWUXPHQWZKLFK
belongs to it. So the will arrives at freedom through love, nay, becomes itself 
love, for love unites with God (Eckhart, 2001). 
This kind of participative freedom is only properly conceivable within a theological 
context since therein we discover the established order in which freedom can be 
granted. In order to further contextualise and clarify the question of agency in modern 
philosophy I now turn to Paul Ricoeur.  
 
Paul Ricoeur and the Crisis of Subjectivity 
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In many ways, Ricoeur would be the obvious thinker with which to seek philosophical 
clarification of the middle voice, given his interest in exploring the interface between 
philosophy and theology. His desire to hold in creative tension many oppositions, also 
FRPPHQGV KLV WKLQNLQJ WR WKH SUHVHQW TXHVWLRQ 5LFRHXU¶V PHGLDWLRQV RI KLVWRU\ DQG
truth, ideology and utopia, hermeneutics and phenomenology, show a pattern in which 
what is given universally can only be disclosed within the particular manifestation of 
the historical moment. Although I have been unable to find any explicit discussion of 
the middle voice in Ricoeur, I think it worthwhile to turn to his conception of 
subjectivity and agency. 
For Ricoeur, the modern subject is a derivative notion whose autonomous 
freedom to act can only be established at the price of displacing the context in which 
actLRQ LV VWUXFWXUHG 5LFRHXU¶V SKLORVRSKLFDO DQWKURSRORJ\ GRHV QRW DOORZ IRU VXFK D
displaced subjectivity. Yet, Ricoeur observes, modernity seems to have left us with an 
unsatisfying choice between acknowledging the absolute freedom of the Cartesian 
foundationalist self, and accepting the Nietzschean deconstruction leaving us nothing 
other than a rhetorical self ± rhetorical in the sense that its existence as a foundational 
moment of subjective identity, turns out to be nothing more than a insubstantial 
rhetorical strategy. The foundationalist self is free to act autonomously, as if self-
GHWHUPLQLQJ %XW DV 1LHW]VFKH¶V GHFRQVWUXFWLRQ RI WKH VHOI KDV XQIROGHG WKDW VHOI KDV
EHFRPHLQFUHDVLQJO\³KXPLOLDWHG´5LFRHXUS:HDUHOHIWZLWKDUKHWRULFDO
VHOIZKRVHFDSDELOLW\WRDFWVHHPVFULWLFDOO\XQGHUPLQHG5LFRHXU¶VODWHUZRUNKDVEHHQ
committed to mediating the polarity between the foundational and rhetorical self such 
that a choice between them turns out to be false. Clearly the effort to constitute an 
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authentic identity for the self is intimately associated with the question of human 
agency.  
It must be emphasised that Ricoeur is committed to an ontology of human 
agency. We are capable beings and we do act in the fullest sense. However, from the 
perspective of modern explanatory accounts, typical of the natural sciences, we are able 
to observe a series of elements that structure human action from social and cultural 
influences, to biological and even neurological determinations. According to Ricoeur, 
recent action theory has generally considered actions from the perspective of a 
³VRPHWKLQJWKDWRFFXUV´5LFRHXUSS-61; van den Hengel, 2002, p. 75). There 
is a pressure to conceive of any occurrence in objective terms, namely as an event rather 
than an action.4 Consequently, unless we revert to a Cartesian foundationalism, what we 
generally call actions are in danger of becoming only events since there can be no 
access whatsoever to the agency which defines the occurrence as an action. These 
events are objective observable entities that do not depend upon an analysis or 
DSSHDUDQFHRIWKH³ZKR´± the subjective agent.  
From this point of view it might seem like a remarkable fact that analytic 
philosophy has not fallen, more generally, into an irremediable determinism. To be sure, 
analytic theories of action are concerned with intention and motivation, so why do we 
not discover the core of identity and of capability within these intentions? The problem 
here is that it is quite possible that such intentions and motivations are themselves 
organized by principles that are no less vulnerable to further explanation. The space left 
for the irreducible identity of human agency cannot be secured or guaranteed. Every 
level of life seems explicable in terms potentially, if not actually, available to scientific 
explanation, and those who wish to maintain a notion of radical freedom in the midst of 
these explanatory paradigms, begin to look rather like nineteenth or twentieth century 
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theologians who dogmatically defend their majestic divinity between the gaps left by 
the latest scientific theory (e.g., God of the gaps). The notion that there might be a 
kernel of free agency that cannot be observed in terms of any exterior motivation has no 
basis in analytic explanation, and can only rest upon a Cartesian foundationalism. From 
WKLVSHUVSHFWLYHLWVHHPVWKDWWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKH³GHDWKRIWKHVXEMHFW´KDYH\HWWR
be fully unfolded. But what of the compatibilist views? The attempts of compatibilists 
to overcome the duality of agency and determinism, without reduction or negation, too 
often seem to postpone the question of the phenomenology of agency, and allow the 
free act to occur only because of the assent of a more deeply determined motivation.5 
The real tension of the aporia becomes apparent when we consider 
indeterminacy as the alternative to determinism. As many philosophers have pointed 
out, indeterminacy provides no stronger ground for agency than determinism (McGinn, 
1993, p. 81; Strawson, 1986, p. 25). If determinism argues that our actions are, to quote 
&ROLQ0F*LQQ³uniquely necessitated by prior states of the world, just like every other 
HYHQW´0F*LQQS WKHQWKHUHLVQRVXFKWKLQJDVJHQXLQHDFWLRQ WKHUHDUH
only events. On the other hand, indeterminacy simply suggests that a force of 
randomness is responsible for the event. Again, there is no action here, only a random 
occurrence, an event. Calling upon the notion of indeterminacy does not provide the 
libertarian with any foundation on which to place the autonomous self. Is it the 
polarized discourse of active/passive that has resulted in this impasse? Could the 
linguistic figure of the middle voice provide a way forward? Although Ricoeur does not 
explicitly refer to the linguistic middle voice, his response certainly evokes a middle 
discourse. 
For Ricoeur, the moment of perceiving the action of the agent can take place, 
but it cannot be taken as a foundational moment. Ricoeur uses the term attestation to 
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distinguish this moment in which something is somehow known through a direct 
understanding and affirmation (1992, pp. 21-23). We know ourselves to be free agents 
that make choices though there is no ground for that knowledge in purely explanatory 
WHUPV7RVD\WKDWµZHNQRZ¶RXUVHOYHVWREe agents is not quite faithful to Ricoeur who 
wishes rather to indicate that we testify to our own self-understanding (and 
understanding of others) as agents throughout life itself. The testimony is sufficient but 
only if we recognize that this attestation does not offer an invulnerable ground for the 
self. It is, rather, an unverifiable confidence in human capability that requires both 
understanding as well as explanation. It is, then, open to alterity, and therefore, to 
reinterpretation. The same unverifiable confidence offers us the possibility of relating to 
the other, an other which, analytically speaking, must remain transcendent, and thereby 
unknowable, even impossible. 
Attempts to account for the ghost in the machine do not necessarily withstand 
the analytical approaches to subjectivity. Ricoeur prefers to speak of a narrative identity 
DULVLQJRXWRIDQ³LQWXLWLYHDSSUHKHQVLRQ´SQDQDSSUHKHQVLRQLQZKLFK
the story of the self is the mediation of self-identity, and presence of alterity. As Ricoeur 
VD\V³WKHUHLVQRVHOI-XQGHUVWDQGLQJWKDW LVQRWPHGLDWHGE\VLJQVV\PEROVDQGWH[WV´
(1991, p. 15). In speaking of the narrative self constructed within the engagement 
between oneself and another, Ricoeur is clearly evoking a middle term. It is, perhaps, 
surprising that Ricoeur does not make explicit discussion of a philosophy of the middle 
voice. Let us now briefly turn to Derrida, a thinker who appears to engage more 
explicitly with the middle voice.  
 




in her book After Writing+HUH3LFNVWRFNLVQRWFRQYLQFHGE\'HUULGD¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ
RI3ODWR¶VPhaedrusDQGRIIHUVLQVWHDGDFOHDUH[SUHVVLRQRI3ODWR¶VLQWLPDWLRQVRIWhe 
middle voice in understanding the role of eros in the Socratic gaze. Pickstock argues 
that Derridean différance does not successfully exceed the contrast between active and 
passive, and so fails to orient us to genuine mystery. It is worth recalling thaW'HUULGD¶V
conception of différance represents the attempt to defer the consummation or closure of 
the meaning of a signifier or text. Justice, to take a paradigmatic example, continually 
interrupts law, leading to the endless deferral of a state of genuine legislated peace. So 
the differentiation of opposition implies an endless cycle of displacement which is 
différance. For Pickstock, what this process amounts to is a suppression, rather than 
attenuation, of agency (1998, pp. 116-117). Pickstock says, 
DeUULGD¶V TXDOLILFDWLRQ RI WKH DXWRQRPRXV VXEMHFW YLD WKH UHPRYDO RI DOO
elements of choice, intention, desire, and particularity from the speaker or writer, 
does not mean that différance is in the middle voice, for rather than mediating all 
divine via human action, it merely forces the speaker into a situation of double 
passivity, both unable to choose language (rather, chosen by it), and unaware of 
this passivity (1998, p. 36). 
 
Derrida is unable to announce the middle voice apart from the context of the continually 
differentiated undecidable that results only in a violent suppression of agency and of 
VXEMHFWLYLW\ 7R SXW WKLV LQ D EURDGHU FRQWH[W 3LFNVWRFN FRQWUDVWV 'HUULGD¶V IDLOXUH WR
escape the duality of active/passive and the violence implied within LW ZLWK 3ODWR¶V
³RXWZLWWLQJ RI WKH GXDOLW\´  S  WKURXJK WKH UROH RI HURV ,Q WKH Phaedrus, 
Socrates explores the double-vision implied in the erotic gaze in which empirical sight 
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is made possible within the movement of recognition or recollection. By its capacity to 
subordinate itself to that upon which it looks, this erotic phenomenon is neither active 
nor passive, rather the participation of both is the precondition of any sight at all. 
Associating this participation with subjectivity Pickstock VD\V³7KLVJD]HGRHVQRWDULVH
from an autonomous subject, but by the ambiguous action/passion of recognition, 
EHFRPHV D JD]H ZKLFK UHFHLYHV LQWR LWVHOI WKDW ZKLFK RIIHUV LWVHOI WR EH UHFRJQLVHG´
(1998, p. 32). As was suggested earlier, this participative ontology is very much a part 
of Greek thinking, and Pickstock is seeking to restore our sensitivity to its significance. 
More fundamentally, there is a concern to undercut the violence of the dualist order that 
imposes itself throughout the history of philosophy, a dualism that is not avoided by the 
medial undecidability of différance which renders both agency and object impossible. 
For Pickstock the middle voice rests upon the kind of participative ontology that 
Derrida would reject, but that seems centrDO WR +HLGHJJHU¶V DSSURDFK 7KH GHJUHH WR
which this participative ontology is theological in nature must remain an open question 
at this stage, though, I would suggestively ask in what does participation participate if 
not some divine order? Despite the fact that Heidegger is well-known to be sceptical of 
explicitly theological discourse, it is clear that he evokes this participative ontology by 
exploring the space between activity and passivity, for example where he speaks of real 
thinking as a response to what calls for thinking, or what gives itself to be thought 
(Heidegger, 1968). So it is to Heidegger that we now turn. 
 
The Middle Voice of Heidegger 
 
0\ LQWHUHVW LQ +HLGHJJHU¶V XVH RI WKH PLGGOH YRLFH ILUVW DURVH LQ DWWHPSWLQJ WR
understand why HeideggeU¶VFRPPHQWDWRUVRIWHQWDNHKLVTXHVWLRQLQJRIWHFKQRORJ\WR
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be an expression of technological determinism or fatalism. To put it briefly, 
SKLORVRSKHUVKDYHRIWHQUHMHFWHG+HLGHJJHU¶VDQDO\VLVRIWHFKQRORJ\RQWKHJURXQGVWKDW
it is both essentializing and fatalistic, and that consequently we are left helpless before 
the destiny of modern technology (Thomson, 2005, pp. 47-52; Feenberg, 1999, p. 14-
17). The perceived fatalism consists in the concealment both of the technological 
disclosure of being, as well as the fact that it is us who disclose being technologically. 
We are slaves to a technological rationality that we ourselves are engaged in, and it is 
our passionate and intensifying technological engagement that makes us blind to the 
fatalism behind technological enframing.  
This reading of Heidegger is unhelpful for many reasons, but mainly, I think, 
because it rests upon an anthropology ± and an associated conception of agency ± that is 
IXQGDPHQWDOO\ RSSRVHG WR WKH G\QDPLFV RI +HLGHJJHU¶V SKLORVRSKLFDO Sroject. 
+HLGHJJHU¶V TXHVWLRQ RI EHLQJ UHPDLQV IXQGDPHQWDOO\ DQWKURSRORJLFDO WKURXJKRXW KLV
career and although in his later work he abandons the language of Dasein, clearly the 
mutuality of being and human-being is essential to his thought, a mutuality that is 
centrally concerned with the will. So developing a nuanced conception of agency is 
vital if we are to understand the threat of technological rationality, without the 
resignation that might seem to follow.  
+HLGHJJHU¶VODQJXDJHRIWHQUHFDOOVWKHPLGGOH voice, both in his appropriation of 
FRPPRQ*HUPDQH[SUHVVLRQVVXFKDV µHVJLEW¶ OLWHUDOO\PHDQLQJ µLWJLYHV¶DQG LQKLV
RZQFUHDWLYHDSKRULVPV VXFKDV µGLH6SUDFKHVSULFKW¶ WUDQVODWHGDV µODQJXDJHVSHDNV¶
+HLGHJJHUS+HLGHJJHU¶VLQWHUHVW in, and employment of, these linguistic 
forms is central to his philosophical destruction of metaphysics and his attention to the 
question concerning technology. Some commentators have noted the profound unity 




LV WKHXQLW\WREHIRXQGLQ+HLGHJJHU¶VKHUPHQHutical approach described, particularly 
by Rojcewicz, in terms of disclosive looking.6  
 Disclosive looking expresses the sense in which the self-showing of Being 
always involves the partnership of human being. Being shows itself in terms of the 
disclosive ORRNLQJRIKXPDQEHLQJVZKDW5RMFHZLF]FDOOV³WKHDFWLYHUHFHSWLRQRI WKH
self-RIIHULQJ RI %HLQJ´  S  +HLGHJJHU¶V DQDO\VLV RI WKH WHFKQRORJLFDO DJH
VXJJHVWV WKDW DSDUWLFXODU IRUPRI %HLQJ¶V VHOI-VKRZLQJ DQGKXPDQEHLQJ¶VGLVFORVLYH
looking has become predominant. It is a looking, or revealing, that places the world at 
the disposal of human being. Thus Heidegger states: 
The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to 
nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and 
VWRUHGDV VXFK«D WUDFW RI ODQG LV FKDOOHQJHG LQWR WKHSXWWLQJRXWRI FRDO DQG
ore.  The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral 
deposit (1977, p. 13). 
The earth, says Heidegger, reveals itself as resources for human consumption. It is not 
simply the case that human beings disclose the earth in terms of resources. Nor are 
KXPDQ EHLQJV LQDFWLYH LQ WKLV GLVFORVXUH 7KH\ DUH WKH DJHQWV GRLQJ WKH µGLVFORVLYH
ORRNLQJ¶EXWHTXDOO\WKH\DUHWKHSDVVLYHDJHQWVLQUHFHLSWRI%HLQJ¶VVHOIVKRZLQJDV
UHVRXUFH ,Q FRQWUDVW WR WHFKQRORJLFDO UHYHDOLQJ+HLGHJJHU¶V IDPRXV LPDJHRI WKH MXJ
that gathers the fourfold does so through a providential act, an act achieved not simply 
by the maker, or by the jug itself, but by the gathering that is made present in the unity 
of the jug and the world (1975, p. 171). 
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 %XWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRI+HLGHJJHU¶VZULWLQJVRQWHFKQRORJ\RIWHQWHQGWRSODFHKLV
analysis in support either of human activity or passivity. Consequently we are often 
IDFHGZLWKWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQWKDWZHDUHVXEMHFWWR%HLQJ¶VVHOI-showing as technology 
GHWHUPLQHVLW$QGDV,VXJJHVWHGHDUOLHU+HLGHJJHU¶VWDONRIWKHGHVWLQ\RIWHFKQRORJ\
VHDOVKLV IDWHDVD WHFKQRORJLFDOGHWHUPLQLVW+HLGHJJHU¶V ODQJXDJe may not always be 
clear, but I believe this to be a reflection of his orientation to a space between the active 
and the passive, namely the middle voice which as we have noted, generally does not 
belong to modern European languages. Thus Heidegger says: 
Always the destining of revealing holds complete sway over man.  But that 
destining is never a fate that compels.  For man becomes truly free only insofar 
as he belongs to the realm of destining and so becomes one who listens and 
hears, and not one who is simply constrained to obey (1977 p. 25). 
Our general conception of freedom seems confined by this notion of a realm of 
GHVWLQLQJ GHVSLWH +HLGHJJHU¶V DWWHPSWV WR GLVWDQFH LW IURP FRQVWUDLQW RU FRPSXOVLRQ
However, the middle voice can express the sense in which our freedom is constituted in 
relation to what is given, and so structuring or constituting elements can be located 
within such a realm. 
 So I am suggesting that the middle voice plays a foundational role in 
+HLGHJJHU¶V SKLORVRSKLFDO SURMHFW 7KLV LV FOHDUO\ SDUW RI +HLGHJJHU¶V JURXQGLQJ LQ
phenomenology which seeks to undercut the duality of subject and object. It is the 
framing of Being in terms of subject and object that calls Heidegger to repeatedly raise 
the question of Being. Where Being is conceived as objects and subjects, the originary 
phenomenon, which, as Heidegger puts it in Being and Time ³VKRZV LWVHOI LQ LWVHOI´
(1996, p. 25)7 is obscured. Thus the deconstruction of subjective metaphysics entails a 
deconstruction of the duality of activity and passivity. As Charles Scott says, ³[b]oth the 
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PLGGOH YRLFH DQG LWV REVFXULW\«SURGXFH RU \LHOG WKRXJKW SURFHVVHV E\ ZKLFK WKH
subject-object structure is overcome´ (1989, p. 753). While Scott offers an interesting 
analysis of the middle voice in continental philosophy, his suggestion that the subject-
object structure is to be µovercome¶ might be accused of inverting the actual problem. 
As has already been suggested, the middle voice expresses a mode prior to the subject-
object structure. It is, then, less a case of overcoming than undercutting this structure, 
that is to say, of addressing the ground from which the subject-object structure emerges. 
The extent to which we are appropriated by subjective metaphysics is proportionate to 
the extent to which we are able to think outside of the domain of activity and passivity. 
This idea of thinking outside the domain of the will is fundamentally different from 
negation or submission of the will. Such negations or submissions remain within the 
economy of the will and are, to that extent, sublimations that serve merely to sustain, or 
even extend, the currency of wilful subjectivity. Where mystical theology rests upon the 
suppression of human will, it fails to radically undercut this structure. This is what 
makes EcNKDUW¶V FDOO WR DEDQGRQ WKH ZLOO JHQXLQHO\ UDGLFDO KLV FRQFHSWLRQ RI
detachment does not rest with the suppression or negation of the will, but makes the 
move to undercut entirely the structure of wilful subjectivity, a theme we will soon draw 
out, but not before we more clearly acknowledge the clarification that Heidegger makes. 
 We have seen that the attempt to think outside the domain of subjectivity can be 
FRUUHODWHG ZLWK +HLGHJJHU¶V FDOO WR WKLQN RXWVLGH WKH GRPDLQ RI WKH ZLOO ,Q KLV VWXG\
Heidegger and the Will, Bret Davis perceives a FUXFLDO GLIIHUHQFH LQ +HLGHJJHU¶V
thinking between not-willing ± as the simple negation of the will, and non-willing ± 
which indicates a fundamental attunement that is anterior to will (2007, p. 15; see also 
Llewelyn, 1991, p. 208-209). The former is a passivity or quietism that is opposed to the 
active assertion of the will, but itself requires some form of assent or resolve. This is 
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clearly not the gelassenheit (releasement or detachment) of Heidegger, or of Eckhart. 
The latter is harder to define since our language frames thinking in terms already within 
this domain of the will. That is to say that the structure of the linguistic subject and 
object/predicate, mirrors the structure of the active and passive voice. 
 Rather than conceive the will as a faculty of human subjectivity, Heidegger 
tends to reverse this view by seeing subjectivity as an expression of the will. Heidegger 
refers approvingly to 6FKHOOLQJ¶V reflections on the will, saying,  
[t]he will in this willing does not mean here a capacity of the human soul, 
KRZHYHU WKHZRUG µZLOOLQJ¶KHUHGHVLJQDWHV WKH %HLQJRIEHLQJV DV DZKROH
Every single being and all beings as a whole have their essential powers in and 
through the will (1968, p. 91). 
Drawing out the imSOLFDWLRQV RI +HLGHJJHU¶V DSSURSULDWLRQ RI ZLOO Davis asks the 
IROORZLQJOHDGLQJTXHVWLRQ³ZKDWLILWZHUHWKHFDVHWKDWWKLQNLQJLQWHUPVRIDVXEMHFW
ZKRSRVVHVVHVIDFXOWLHVDµVXEMHFWZKRZLOOV¶DOUHDG\LQYROYHVDSDUWLFXODUZLOIXOPRGH
of being-in-the-ZRUOG"´ (2007, p. 6). Davis goes on to argue that for Heidegger the 
modern subject, who thinks by way of representations and who wills through volition, is 
very much a product of a more fundamental attunement to Being. Being outside the 
domain of the will, on the other hand, is not simply a human achievement, and might 
then, be best expressed within the middle voice. It is both something that appropriates 
us, as much as something we appropriate. It seems that a free relation to this basic 
attitude or attunement is possible insofar as we can be aware of its existence. And yet 
modern languages tend to disclose things in terms of the polarity that we have sought to 
interrupt. Little wonder that +HLGHJJHU¶VSKLORVRSK\ZKLFKDVPXFKDV DQ\WKLQJ LV D
philosophy of language, so often seeks to excavate ancient Greek thinking. 
&RQVHTXHQWO\ VR PXFK RI +HLGHJJHU¶V WHUPLQRORJ\ FDQ RQO\ UHDOO\ EH H[SUHVVHG LQ 
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what I loosely refer to as a middle discourse: terms such as appropriation (Enowning), 
unconcealment (Aletheia), event (Ereignis) and releasement (Gelassenheit); along with 
more dynamic expressLRQV VXFK DV µWKH WKLQJ WKLQJV¶ (1975, p. 181) DQG WKH µUHJLRQ
regions¶ (1966).  
 For Eckhart, particularly the later Eckhart, WKHSRVVLELOLW\RI*RG¶VZLOOGRHs not 
arise as we negate our own, just as the possibility of the disclosure of being in 
Heidegger does not correlate with the diminution of Cartesian subjectivity. (FNKDUW¶V
radical suggestion is FORVHU VWUXFWXUDOO\ VSHDNLQJ WR +HLGHJJHU¶V HIIRUW WR HVFDSH
entirely the domain of the will ± to non-willing. (FNKDUW¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIIUHHGRPLVQRW
the negation of the will, but rather is found in the pure freedom of the soul in God, a 
freedom which escapes altogether the problematics of the will in modern philosophy. 
As Eckhart makes explicit in one of his bolder moments, ³ZKHQ , FRPH WREH IUHHRI
ZLOO RIP\VHOI DQGRI*RG¶VZLOO DQGRI DOO KLVZRUNV DQGRI*RGKLPVHOI WKHQ , DP
above all created things, and I am neither God nor creature, but I am what I was and 
what I shall remain, now and HWHUQDOO\´ 4XRWHG LQ McGinn, 2001, p. 143). Denys 
Turner has persuasively argued that the nature of Eckhartian detachment is not to be 
conceived as an experience of self-abnegation or radical surrender of will. This is not 
least because such a conception of surrender views detachment within an experiential 
FRQWH[WZKROO\IRUHLJQWRWKHFRQFHUQVWKDWDQLPDWH(FNKDUW¶VZULWLQJV'HWDFKPHQWLV
QRWVLPSO\WKH³TXLHWLVPRIGHVLUH´ (Turner, 1998, p. 179), because such a conception 
seeks a ³SV\FKRORJLFDO FRQGLWLRQ RI GHVLUHOHVVQHVV´ (Turner, 1998, p. 181) which is 
simply the opposite of psychological desire, thus remaining structured within the 
economy of the will. To negate the will is still structured by the movement of the will. 
As Turner says: 
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To be detached is not therefore to be desireless of creation in order to desire 
only God, nor is it to desire nothing at all, even God. Rather, it is to desire out 
RIWKDWQRWKLQJQHVVRIVHOIDQG*RGVRWKDWIURPWKHVHFXULW\RIWKLVµIRUWUHVV
of WKH VRXO¶ which nothing create can enter, we can desire all things with a 
GHVLUHWUXO\GLYLQHEHFDXVHLWLVGHVLUHµZLWKRXWDZK\¶ (1998, 185). 
(OVHZKHUH7XUQHULGHQWLILHVWKLVGHWDFKHGGHVLUHDV³WKHUHVWRUDWLRQRIGHVLUHWRDSURSHU
relation of objectiYLW\RUUHYHUHQFHIRULWVREMHFW´ (1998, p. 183). Here it becomes clear 
that neither simple affirmation nor negation is enough. What is called for is a more 
radical step in which desire accords with its object, a movement in which the agent is 
both passive and active. The poetical dimension of Eckhart and of Heidegger is, in part, 
an expression of the conservation of a middle discourse in which our speaking 
participates in what calls to be said, in which our desire corresponds to its object, and 
where intellect and thought arise as the participation in that which calls to be thought. 
My speculative thesis has been to argue that a sedimentation of diathesis within 
language has taken place, resulting in the marginalisation, even elimination, of a central 
realm of human experience. I have identified this realm primarily with the linguistic 
middle voice, but also more loosely with what I have called a middle discourse. This 
radical thesis requires more working through than I have been able to offer in this essay. 
Indeed, I have employed the linguistic context partly as a vehicle on which to develop a 
more general thesis that this middle discourse is remarkable by its absence in modern 
thought, especially where thought turns to questions of agency, responsibility and 
decision. Or more specifically, that many discussions of freedom and agency take for 
granted an impossible choice that modern language leaves us with.  
Furthermore, the structure of my argument could suggest a literal contradiction. 
In attempting to affirm my thesis, that the elimination of the middle voice prevents 
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thinking in terms of conditioned freedom or structured agency, I could be criticised for 
failing to consider that the force of logic within the discussion would suggest that I 
would be unable to announce the very thesis I wish to propose! How can I speak of that 
which I allege to be lost from speech? How have I achieved the unsayable? Of course it 
is not simply unsayable, any more than it is simply sayable. The UHDGHU¶VFDSDFLW\WRVHH
what is meant here depends upon the self-negating groundless ground of Kantian 
autonomy. It is for this reason that the reader is asked to take seriously the notion of a 
dynamic or movement along what Heidegger would call a path (that leads to a wholly 
unanticipated clearing), an image that Eckhart staunchly resists. What does unite 
Heidegger and Eckhart more clearly here is the participative dimension of what 
manifests in the realm of human existence. If, like Heidegger, we attend to what gives 
itself to be thought, then we will, as thinkers, be both active and passive. This is the 
mode of contemplation where true philosophy, in its participative guise, responds to the 
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1
 In The Constitution of Society, Anthony Giddens has developed a sociological analysis 
RIWKLVNLQGRIVWUXFWXUHGFDSDELOLW\LQKLVµVWUXFWXUDWLRQWKHRU\¶LQZKLFKWKHDJHQF\RI
the individual is cast within the context of sociological structures. Those structures form 
a composite structure of capability in which individual freedom is located. 
2
 Although linguists agree that Ancient Greek employs the middle voice, we should 
acknowledge the evidence which suggests that the middle voice was retreating from 
Greek during the New Testament period (Blass and Debrunner, 1961). 
3
 $ORQJVLPLODUOLQHVWKHSKLORVRSKHURIUHOLJLRQ/RXLV'XSUHVD\V³0DQ¶VUHODWLRQWR
the Absolute must be expressed in a number of representations, and even though these 
representations are not the ultimate objecWRIPDQ¶VIDLWKWKH\DUHLQGLVSHQVDEOHPHDQV
IRUWKHVSLULW¶VXQLRQZLWKWKH$EVROXWH´'XPéry, 1968, p. xviii). 
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4
 For Donald Davidson, actions should be classed as a subset of events which seems to 
endanger the ontology of action in the sense for which Ricoeur is arguing, (van den 
Hengel, 2002, pp. 77-78). 
5
 The tradition of compatibilism is first developed by the Stoics, though modern forms 
are rooted in ideas that Schopenhauer encapsulated in his idea that, although we can do 




(2006, pp. 47-55). 
7
 Heidegger here explicitly rHIHUVWRWKH*UHHNPLGGOHYRLFH³Phainesthai is a µmiddle 
voiFH¶FRQVWUXFWLRQRIphainoWREULQJLQWRGD\OLJKWWRSODFHLQEULJKWQHVV´ 
